

C. J. Lefevre

MILITARY REFLECTIONS

ON THE

ATTACK AND DEFENCE

OF THE

CITY OF LONDON;

Proved by the Author to have been the most vulnerable Part
of Consequence in the whole Island, in the Situation
it was left in the Year 1794.

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

Reflections on the Loss of Plymouth or Harwich, and on
the greater Safety of Portsmouth.—Desultory Invasions in various
Parts.—District where 3000 men may land, occupy, and
maintain for a considerable Time against the whole Force of
Britain.—That celebrated Officer, General Lloyd's Abilities and
System used in the Defence of the CAPITAL; and his general
System on the Defence of Rivers applied to the Thames.—
Treatise on Floating Batteries and Gallies.—Treatise on Rifle-
men, Sharp Shooters, Jägers, and Chasseurs; the Utility of
them in all Countries, and the particular Want of them in this
Country and the British Army.—Remarks on Landguard and
Tilbury Forts, and other Fortifications.—Reflections on the
Dearness of Bread.—Proposals how the laborious and in-
dustrious Poor might be supplied with Bread at a moderate
Price in Times of Scarcity.—Improper Application of His
Majesty's generous Donation of one Pound and a Half of Bread
per Day to the Soldier, and how it ought to be applied.—In-
cluding general Remarks on the whole Island.

By Lieut. Col. GEORGE HANGER. *K*

Most respectfully addressed to the

RIGHT HON. THOMAS SKINNER,
LORD MAYOR OF LONDON.

LONDON:

Printed for J. DEBRET, opposite Burlington House,
Piccadilly, 1795. 240

CITY OF LONDON:

that it was in the year 1861
of Congress in the whole history of the State
the Union to have been the most valuable part

1954-55 117287 51



44

۷۰۰

25

435.

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

THOMAS SKINNER,

LORD MAYOR OF LONDON.

MY LORD,

I HAVE taken the liberty of addressing this military treatise, respecting the defence of the capital against a sudden surprize by a foreign enemy, to your Lordship ; not only from the situation which you so honourably fill, as chief magistrate of that great, opulent, and important city, but for the esteem and respect I have for your Lordship's private worth and character.

The prosperity of the city of London cannot be an object of indifference to an Eng-

A 2

lishman,

lishman, nor its safety against all possible danger unworthy the contemplation of every man who wishes well to his country. These considerations gave birth to the present undertaking. If I have executed my design so as to acquire the approbation of your Lordship, and the other guardians and magistrates of the capital, I shall be amply rewarded for my labours.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient

And most humble servant,

GEORGE HANGER.

London,

March 11, 1795.



ATTACK AND DEFENCE
OF THE
CITY OF LONDON,
&c. &c.

SHORTLY after the ambassadors from Tippoo Sultan had departed from the court of France, I was well assured, from persons whose situation in life entitled them to information, that it was the intent of that treacherous and intriguing court, our mortal enemy, that the Sultan Tippoo should break with us in India under the most solemn promises of support from France, in that country, and by a general war in Europe.

B

The

The Sultan, never imagining that a revolution so rapid and so complete could take place in a government so despotic and tyrannical, and believing that the court of France undoubtedly would keep their promise with him, which they would have done, kept to his engagements faithfully, commenced war against us, and was ruined : the rising power in France turned not their thoughts to India, but to the completion of a work they had begun, the overturning of a government that was hateful and oppressive to them.

I plainly foresaw an approaching war ; I was not one of those self-conceited Englishmen who dispose the common enemy, and though they did not exactly follow the vulgar idea that John Bull formerly thought and said, that one Englishman was a match for three Frenchmen, yet many, and I am sorry to say, sensible and well-informed men, have said, that they wished their heads might never ache until the French invaded this country : I hope to God, my Lord, their
 hearts

hearts will never ache, which would be the case, should the enemy ever be in possession of our capital. I always looked upon the French nation as the most enterprizing nation on the earth, and no undertaking too arduous for their enterprize. The gallantry of the French officers, for ages past, has been proverbial, and little distant from enthusiasm. The common soldier did not feel that ardour which he now does, because he was a slave, badly paid and fed, worse treated, and fighting by compulsion for that phantom honour and glory: make men enthusiastic in the cause of liberty or religion, or any thing else, it matters not what it is, so that they but feel it; they are difficult to be conquered, and there is no undertaking, let it be ever so dangerous or arduous, they will not attempt. It is our duty, my Lord, to view them in their proper light. Let us neither undervalue them or fear them, but prepare to meet them undauntedly; let us unanimously unite in the defence of the capital. London, my Lord, is the only place where they can essentially do us an irrepara-

nable injury; any other place in the kingdom, even Portsmouth or Plymouth, would, though great, be only a partial evil, were they burnt to-morrow. Have not we been in possession of Toulon? Did we not burn their arsenals? If either of the above places were destroyed to-morrow, it would not render us *a province to France*; but if the *capital* should ever be in their possession, burnt, pillaged, and destroyed, I am afraid we should be but little better.

It was at as distant a period of time that I above mention, shortly after the departure of the Sultan's ambassadors from Paris, that I began to reflect seriously on the danger my country might be exposed to by invasion, in a war which nothing could have prevented but the revolution in France. I made it my particular attention and study to attend to the attack and defence of the capital, being conscious that if the enemy intended essentially to injure us, and attempt to strike a mortal blow at the vitals of our constitution and wealth, that London would be their object,

object, because in the state it was (and even now remains) it is the most vulnerable part of the whole island of any place of consequence, as it is absolutely defenceless.

I beg, my Lord, I may be rightly understood; it is not my intent to treat of a solid and permanent invasion in great force, when I mention the danger the capital has been in; I write only relative to a coup de main, directed against the capital, which I think very practicable and likely to be attempted, provided steps are not taken to prevent it, which may easily be done, and without any considerable expense; both, I hope, my Lord, to be able to point out. Before I proceed to prove in how defenceless a state the capital of our country has been, and was left all last year, and also even after the French had possession of Holland, I shall relate three instances of the ideas our enemies have had of invading this country, two of which can be proved, being of late date, the third handed down to us from a more distant period of time. M. de

Choiseul acknowledged, that in his administration, a serious plan of attacking this country was meditated. I, myself, know that the Duke de Biron, then Duke de Lauzune, last war was pitched upon by the French government to bear a particular share in an embarkation against this country, from his having lived so many years in it, and from his knowledge of it. The last, though not the least instance, in my humble opinion, and more to be attended to, was what Marshal Saxe gave as his ideas when his opinion was asked relative to a landing in the west of England, “If you intend
 “to invade England, land a body of men,”
 says that general, “as near to the capital as
 “you can, and march directly to London;
 “if you succeed, you ruin the English, any
 “thing else will be but of little use.”

How shocking it is, my Lord, when we reflect that the capital, on the safety of which depends our existence as a great nation, should have been left so exposed to the depredations of the enemy, who, I am confident,

fident, might last year have marched to it unopposed, with so small a body of men as 10,000, for at that time there were not 4000 under the command of Lord Townsend at Warley ; that officer's well-known abilities would have availed him little ; he would have had the mortification of being beaten, and afterwards of seeing the enemy march into the capital, without his being able to hinder them ; a heart-breaking sight to so experienced and gallant an officer, who shared in the glories of Wolf and Monkton, in his advanced age, after having served his country in the zenith of her glory and power, to see the capital of his native country burned and sacked by the foe, and all this not by his neglect, but by the inattention of his superiors, who placed him in such a situation, without powers to oppose an enemy on a sudden and rapid march to the capital.

As Lord Amherst reviewed all the camps last year in character of commander in chief, and the Duke of Richmond commanded in
 per-

person the army at Brighton (for so I surely am entitled to call it, as there was no other body of troops so near to the capital; and am also confidently informed, that this body of troops were the most able, as well as particularly destined to move at a moment's warning to the relief of the capital, if invaded from the eastern coast, or elsewhere,) I have a right, my Lord, to imagine, at least, that both these officers approved of the position of the army near Brighton; and that the commander in chief also approved of various other positions in this country, some good and some bad. I do not in the least intend to lay any personal blame on either of these officers, for I know full well, that they of themselves alone do not govern; it is not the absolute manufacture of their own hands; it is a general assent to such particular points of defence, which they, as a part of the present government, are placed to execute. But I must confess that it strikes me with wonder, that a man of the Duke of R——'s well known abilities, which even
his

his enemies never denied him, and that Lord A——ft, who has seen fo much active fervice, fhould (without remonftrating on the danger and the grofs abfurdity of that pofition) permit the moft active force we had, in cafe of an invafion deftined againft the capital, to lay at Brighton, where it is abfolutely to a great degree ufelefs.

I will not belie my own judgment or my confcience, either to flatter or to court any man or any fet of men, but will boldly declare, that the pofition of the army at Brighton was *false and unmilitary*. All this, my Lord, I hope to be able to prove, as follows:—No military man, I am convinced, will tell me, that there is any one town on the coaft of Suffex, that is of fuch confequence as to require an army to protect it. Then, my Lord, there can be but one object in keeping the army at Brighton to have it *apported* to the relief of Portfmouth: to which I reply, that were our grand fleet beaten, and one third of them taken and deftroyed by the enemy, they never would dare to attack

C

even

even the remainder of that fleet laying at Spithead.

But there is another point to be observed, that if Portsmouth was attacked, it is able to hold out and protect itself until we can bring troops from all parts of Britain to relieve and support it.

I therefore trust, my Lord, that if there cannot be given any other reason for that army lying at Brighton, but its being *apportioned* to Portsmouth, that it is of no use whatever in that position, and may be used to a better purpose, and with much greater effect, in some other position, which I shall point out. As to the town of Brighton, or any other town near to it, they can never be of any consequence to the state at large; for if burned by the enemy, it would be of no more detriment to the state at large, than an alderman bursting at a turtle feast would effect the public credit and wealth of the city of London.

Every

Every candid person will, I hope, acknowledge, that we have at different times been much alarmed, and have with due reason imagined, that the enemy intended to invade us. History informs us, my Lord, when the French fleet, in the year (I think it was in 1744) lay off Dungeness, bank notes then were considerably under par for the space of several days. I shall, my Lord, quote some more eminent and recent instances of danger, and shall attempt also to point out others that may happen, if proper steps are not taken to prevent them.

When the French and Spanish fleets lay off Plymouth, it cannot be denied but they might have landed in the west; and, in my humble opinion, when Lord Howe last war went to the relief of Gibraltar, the French might at that particular period have landed any where they chose. I hope, my Lord, I may risk an opinion why they did not attempt an invasion at that time; their military force was nothing equal to what it

now is ; they had not more than 250,000* men to guard their extensive frontier, garrison their West India possessions, and assist the Americans with a military force against us. At that time, my Lord, they had only an army, but now they are an *armed nation* ; at that time, my Lord, they were not in possession of *Brabant*, and what is more doubly destructive to us, they were not in the *possession of Holland*, by which, my Lord, to use a military expression, *they have effectually turned the left flank of Britain*. How doubly suspicious ought we now to be, when our military position is so much altered, and our *whole eastern coast open* to their depredations, which it never was by many degrees so much, before this unfortunate period.

There are particular times when our grand fleet, however formidable, are abso-

* General Lloyd says, they had but 220,000 when they entered into the seven years war, and invaded Hanover, and other parts of Germany, and had to defend Canada, and all their other foreign possessions.

lutely

lutely ufelefs, and unable to protect us from invafion; I fhall quote a few inftances:—
 Firft, when they are many hundred miles at fea weft of the Land's End; next, my Lord, be pleafed to obferve, that when they are either at Plymouth or Spithead, and the wind blows ftrong at eaft, they cannot come up channel to the relief of the capital, or any other place that lay eaft from them. Next, my Lord, be pleafed to confider that the fame wind which keeps our fleet from coming up Channel, is favourable for the French to invade us, and when that very wind changes, it will carry them home long before it can bring our fleet, or any part of it, from Plymouth, or even Spithead. Again, be pleafed to obferve my farther remarks, that our grand fleet never can dare approach a lee fhore; and what is more to our difadvantage, they can do little or nothing amongft fand banks and fhoals, of which there are abundance off many parts of our coafts, and moft particularly in, and at the approach to the river Thames; therefore it is my opinion, that if the enemy ever come with a

superior *flotilla*, they may effect a landing, in spite of our fleet.

It has been a general received opinion, that as long as our fleets are superior at sea, that we never can be invaded. In my opinion, my Lord, this is the most extravagant and the wildest idea that ever entered the mind of man ; *it originated in folly*, and has been nursed in the lap of national insolence, presuming too much upon our superiority at sea. No one glories more in the wooden walls of Old England than I do, on them depend our wealth, commerce, possessions, and consequence as a great nation ; but they, I am sorry to say, can have but little to do in an invasion, except in the deeper waters of the west of England, and much less now than they ever had, as the French are in possession both of Holland and Brabant, by which our situation as a nation is totally altered.

My Lord, I have seriously reflected on my pillow on the danger the capital has been exposed

posed to, within these few months, since the French have been in possession of Holland; the *easterly winds prevailing, with dark and long nights*, and not a ship in the mouth of the Thames, or near it,* or any defence whatever, that I know of, to protect the capital; I confess it is to my utter astonishment that they have not run a body of men over in the long nights from Holland into the Thames, for in seven hours after landing, they might have been in London *without opposition*; indeed, they have had their hands pretty full of business, which I believe is the only reason they did not, but this is no reason why we should think they *will not* do it. I know full well, my Lord, that I write strong, and that it is my intent to paint the dangers stronger, and that many may say, however successful I may be in pointing out some particular points of de-

* If ever so powerful a British fleet had been stationed in the Downs, the wind blowing strong at east, they could never weather the North Foreland to come into the Thames.

fence that ought to be attended to, yet that this book tends to alarm the citizens of London; to which I will reply, that my heart is warm and zealously attached to the interest of the city of London, and to my country; and that if they can lay no worse charge to my door, I shall be satisfied; for I devoutly wish I was endowed with ten times the powers I possess, that I might ten-fold impress on the minds of the city of London the dangers they have been exposed to, and will be exposed to, until other steps are taken for their protection.

Let me ask a question; if France should make peace with some of the foreign powers, (which she seems at present desirous of) against what place can she turn the powers of her numerous armies but against this island?*

* I confess that I give the preference to Ireland, as it is the weaker part, and an invasion there would cause a very powerful diversion in their favour, and would greatly facilitate any attempt they might have in view against this country, by detaching a part of our forces.

In spite of our grand fleet they may land whenever they please, (I had almost said, wherever they please). I might be asked, Where do you think they could land? to which I would only reply, *any where*, when our fleet is at sea.

When I say, my Lord, that the French may land at particular times, wherever they please, I do not think them so indiscreet as to land indiscriminately any where, at the first point of land they can make. No, my Lord, my opinion is quite the contrary; for I am of opinion, that there is but one place in all England where they can land, and with any probability of success attempt our capital, which in due time I shall point out. But when I say, they *may land any where, in spite of our grand fleet*, (except in the deeper waters of the western shores) it is with this intent, to destroy that vulgar opinion, founded in ignorance and supported by national insolence, presuming too much on our powers at sea, that the French can never invade us as long

as our grand Channel fleet has the superiority, or is able to face the French.

I am happy to see the exertions that lately have been used to man our navy; it might have been thought of sooner: but let not the city of London build their safety, their wealth and property, solely on the powers of our fleet. No, my Lord, let them take every other precaution, especially by land, so that they may be in the most perfect security, and bid defiance to the French, should our fleets not be able, or so situated, as not to prevent an invasion. I must thus far acknowledge, that if a part of our fleet were to meet a French embarkation destined to this coast, in the middle of the Channel, they would destroy or disperse it: so they likewise would do, were they to meet any expedition at sea destined either to the East or West Indies, or to America or Ireland. I hope, my Lord, I have pointed out many instances when our fleet can be but of little use to us, and that we ought not to trust solely, as we injudiciously have hitherto done, to their protection;

tection ; but take more effectual measures for the safety of our island, and most especially for the safety of the capital.

I shall now proceed to state to your Lordship, if I was an officer in the enemy's army, in what manner I would advise that an attack on the capital should be conducted by a coup de main. After which, my Lord, I shall give my opinion as a British officer, how the capital may be defended and placed in perfect security. No one part of which has as yet been done by those whose duty it was to attend to the defence of the most essential point of all others in the whole island.

I shall be very short in my description of the attack of the capital on the Essex side of the Thames, as in the state that county was left all last year, it might have been with very little difficulty effected. Indeed, in my humble opinion, after they had landed, there was no force that could have opposed their immediate march to the ca-

pital: if ever they had attempted, and had succeeded in landing, the whole would have been effected, and our constitution would have received a mortal stab.* My reasons for saying, that I shall be very concise in my description of the enemy's attack of the capital from the Essex side of the Thames, is, that I conceive it to have been so practicable, and the county so totally defenceless, that I am astonished they have not attempted it; for I confess, I know not of any one impediment that could have hindered their landing and marching straight to London. The place I shall point out for them to land at, and the only place they (on the Essex side) can land at, to effect a coup de main against the capital, before we could have collected our forces from distant parts, is, *in the Hope* between East Tilbury and Mucking; the ground is about two miles in distance. There is indeed a very small space of ground to the east of Mucking, about

* Let me ask any military man, what there was to oppose even so small a body as 10,000 men, if they had landed in Essex?

half a mile in extent, where they might land, but it is so narrow, that a very small defence might easily prevent them; and if they did land there, if only a small part of our army was contiguous, they never could form, if a battery was erected in some eligible spot. I am of opinion, they never would attempt it, as it would be madness and certain ruin if they did, as the space is so narrow. But in the state that coast was all last year, neither at this place nor between Mucking and East Tilbury was there the smallest defence or impediment to hinder them. There is not a single battery, or even breast-work erected, nor was there a single cannon nearer than Woolwich, excepting what was at Warley Common, where, as I have already remarked, there were not 4000 men. I therefore may with truth say, that there was nothing to oppose their marching to London when landed; for before an express could be sent to the Duke of Richmond at Brighton, and he could have marched one-third of the way to London, they would have completed their

their business, and would have been on their return to their shipping. Brighton is fifty-six miles from London, and Mucking is but twenty-eight.

I have said, my Lord, that the best place for the enemy to land at is at the Hope; my reason is, that they cannot land in Coringham Marsh or Canvey Island; for if they did, they never could march out to form and fight us. A small army must inevitably beat a numerous one. They could be operated on both with cannon and small arms, in front and on both flanks, before they could form a single battalion, and move one step out of these two marshy places. The nearest place below these is near Leigh or Milton; but if they should land here, they will have eighteen miles farther in their way to the capital, which will give us near a whole day longer to collect our forces than were they to land in the Hope. From Leigh they can go no other way, at their first landing, but by Hadley and Thunderley, which is the strongest country that
can

can be conceived, and where 1000 men could oppose a host; from thence the direct road to London is over Langdon hills, another very strong position and a continual defile. Besides, my Lord, all this is destructive to a coup de main, and cannot be executed. Vigour and rapidity are the only means of rendering a coup de main successful; in such a military enterprise you must advance rapidly towards the object you wish to attain, and that object must not be at too great a distance; stop for nothing one moment, vigorously attack any force that opposes you, and push on. Add to all these obstacles of landing, at the last-mentioned places, I do not believe, that if the wind blows strong at east, that their vessels can ride off Milton, so as to enable them to disembark troops with expedition, as the swell must considerably impede them. But as I never have been there when the wind blew strong, but only in summer, I cannot determine on this point. But I most undoubtedly will determine, that no officer in his senses would attempt to land near
 Leigh,

Leigh, when the same wind that brings him to Leigh will carry him into the Hope, between Mucking and East Tilbury. I therefore look on this place, near Leigh, totally out of the question. Having pointed out the place, in my opinion, that they might have landed at with the greatest ease, there having been neither *troops*, *cannon*, or *works*, to prevent them, I shall proceed, and endeavour to prove, how easily they may be prevented.

I hope, my Lord, now to be able to put the capital in such a state of defence that it can never be attempted by the enemy by a coup de main from the Essex side: I shall begin with giving an opinion of that celebrated and distinguished officer, an author* who is so justly admired by all military men, relative to the passing of rivers,—“ The
 “ passing of rivers is justly considered as
 “ one of the most delicate and dangerous
 “ operations of war, and yet it generally

* Vide General Lloyd's Preface to vol. ii. p. 26, 27.

“ succeeds for want of being perfectly ac-
 “ quainted with them ; and for want of di-
 “ ligence and activity in those who oppose
 “ it, otherwise it cannot succeed ; for
 “ though an enemy cannot prevent your
 “ throwing a bridge under the protection of
 “ your artillery if properly placed, he can,
 “ however, hinder you from occupying
 “ such an extent of ground as is necessary
 “ to develop your army, and may, without
 “ exposing himself to your artillery, attack
 “ any part of it that has passed.

“ This method ought to be embraced ra-
 “ ther than attempt to prevent a passage :
 “ a remarkable instance of this happened in
 “ Italy, in the war for the succession of
 “ Spain : *Prince Eugene* wanted to pass a
 “ certain river which the vigilance of his
 “ antagonist, the Duke of Vendome, had
 “ for a long time prevented ; at length,
 “ however, the Prince having stole a
 “ march, threw over a bridge, and even a
 “ great part of his army had passed and in-
 “ trenched themselves under the protection

“ of the artillery on the other side, so that
 “ Vendome could not attack them without
 “ much loss and danger : he, therefore,
 “ posted his army as near as possible ready
 “ to attack them, if they offered to quit
 “ their retrenchments in order to form and
 “ extend their front, but it was found
 “ quite impracticable; for the Duke had
 “ placed his troops in such a manner, that
 “ they formed a portion of a circle concave
 “ towards the enemy, so that the whole
 “ fire, both of artillery and small arms,
 “ could be directed and concentrated upon
 “ the retrenchments.

“ Prince Eugene having observed the
 “ Duke’s dispositions, was too wise to risk
 “ an action in those circumstances with a
 “ river behind him; he, therefore, ordered
 “ his troops to re-pass the river, and broke
 “ the bridge after them.” This example
 is the best lesson that can be given on the
 defence of rivers.


As

As I conceive, my Lord, that passing a river or landing from vessels is very analogous, and differs only in the one respect by the enemy's being protected at landing by floating batteries and gun-boats, and in the other respect by artillery posted advantageously on the opposite side of the river, so as to command a passage by throwing a bridge over. I am of opinion that General Lloyd's system may be well applied to the defence of the banks of the Thames, which in its proper place I shall make use of, and, I trust, with the greatest advantage and force. The first and greatest object of all others is, to hinder the enemy landing at the above places I have mentioned; but should they effect a landing, we ought certainly to give them battle.* In the present defenceless state of the capital, this could not be done, though necessary, but with the greatest risk and

* We could not have opposed them when the Duke of Richmond's army lay at Brighton, had they landed only 15,000 men, there were not 4000 at Warley Common; further reasons I shall give in the sequel.

most imminent danger, were we even equal in numbers to the troops they brought; for by giving battle, on that battle would depend the fate of London. Should they beat our army, they would find but little further resistance on their march to the capital, as there is no intrenched camp for our beaten army to retreat to between the landing and the capital. *If there were one* where our army might retire to, then we might with safety fight them; but as it now is, *on the event of one single battle you risk the empire.* The safety of London, my Lord, depends on two points, first in using every means possible to prevent the enemy's landing, after that, should they force a landing in the Thames, in having an *intrenched camp* on the direct road to London, and at such a place, and in such a position, that it *cannot be turned* without a circuitous march of many and many miles, which will give us time to collect a numerous army, and will totally destroy the intent of their expedition. The position of that camp I shall point out in due time, and shall first return
to

to the defence of the river in the neighbourhood of Mucking and East Tilbury. This position is strong by nature, and may be made impregnable with little trouble and at a small expense. I propose, my Lord, that at this place the enemy should be opposed in the same manner that General Lloyd informs us the Duke of Vendome opposed Prince Eugene's passage of a river in Italy; our troops should form a portion of a circle concave towards the enemy, and should be protected by three redoubts, one on each flank, and one in front, also concave towards the enemy, and if three redoubts are not judged sufficient to occupy the space of ground, four should be made, one on each flank, and two in front, concave, also towards the enemy.



I prefer the latter, provided even three redoubts could command the ground; because

cause if four redoubts were placed as above, they will have a considerable greater power than three could have, as the enemy must have two more additional bastions to conquer or pass before they can attack the grand curtain, I mean the troops between the redoubts at the marks A. and B. where the greater portion of our troops should be placed; the two smaller curtains between the flank redoubts C. and D. though garnished with fewer troops, are not in the least feeble, the converging fire from the works protect them, and if attacked, they can be supported: but let the Board of General Officers determine that point, or place works in any other direction, or on any spot of ground they may judge fit, so as there are but redoubts thrown up on that ground it is sufficient. I think, my Lord, that 3000 men at this position, protected by works, would defeat any force, however numerous they might be; for which purpose I would wish to see that number of men encamped as contiguous as possible to that spot. As the enemy cannot bring heavy

cannon with them, as they would so greatly impede that rapidity of motion so essential to a *coup de main*. The guns in these works may all be mounted EN BARBETT, provided they are placed at a proper distance from the river, so that they cannot be silenced by heavy floating batteries which the enemy certainly would bring with them as en barbett, they will be able to command the ground in every direction, with greater effect.

I have not forgot the defence of the Thames by water, that will be remarked on in the chapter on floating batteries, galleys, &c. the defence of which, by water, my Lord, I shall surrender to naval officers of experience, as the best judges of operations on that element.

Before I quit the Hope I will mention, that it is highly necessary a work should be erected on the northernmost extremity of the Kentish shore, near a district called Yarlands, where the river turns from east due south,
and

and nearly at a right angle. This must be made different to the other works on the opposite side, between Mucking and East Tilbury; it must contain 400 men at least; it must be a close and regular work, both stockaded and abattised, lest the enemy should land and attempt to storm it, and should not be nearer to the deep water than 1000 yards; that no ship or floating battery may be enabled to silence it. The utility and signal advantage of this work I shall attempt to explain, not only in a coup de main against the capital, but on more *solid operations in force* that may be undertaken by the enemy in the Thames, which I shall, in the sequel, treat of.

Another battery should also be made about mid way on the Kent side, between the above work and the end of the marshes above Higham and in front, and to the north-west of a town called Cliff in the county of Kent. These two works will effectually prevent the enemy's shipping from laying in the Hope, if they are placed

at

at such a distance from the water that they cannot be silenced by their floating batteries. For I will assure your Lordship, that only two thirty-two pounders, at a proper distance, will drive the largest ship in the navy from her moorings, and more especially if there is a supply of red-hot shot.

The work near Yarlands may be manned by troops from Chatham, relieved weekly, and as I do not think that spot, from its marshy situation, to be a healthy one, the men may encamp on the rising grounds near Cliff, leaving only a small guard in the redoubt, from whence, in less than half an hour, they may march to occupy the redoubt, and the other work above Higham may be garrisoned in the same manner, and should be a close work.

I shall now attempt to point out a place; in case the enemy should force a landing at the above-mentioned places, in the Hope, on the Essex side, (which I do not think possible) if works are made on the most ad-

vantageous situations, where the armed citizens of London, with even a part of our army, may bid defiance even to a greater force than the enemy can possibly bring to effect a coup de main. To this place also, if we gave them battle at landing, and our army should be worsted and forced to retreat, it might retire to in safety, as I am of opinion, that the position cannot be forced, nor can it be turned but by such a circuitous march, that it would take up so much time as totally to render abortive a coup de main; and even in a solid invasion, in great force, could not be effected without taking a direct contrary road, and going round nearly as far as Epping, in which case they would have to attempt the passage of that intricate forest, where, in *many places*, they may be fought with inferior numbers to advantage. The danger and obstacles that they must also encounter in such a detour, should they even land *in force*, I shall fully point out in due time and place, and prove, that it would end in their destruction. This position is behind the river

Roding,

Roding, and from the town of Barking to Ilford. The river is navigable the whole way from Barking to Ilford, and there is no bridge between those towns.

I shall now shew, how General Lloyd proves, that small rivers and rivulets may be turned to the greatest advantage, and render the position of an army as formidable and strong, as if it was protected by regular fortifications,

Thus that General writes :* “ I am surprised, that no use is made of small rivers
“ and rivulets to make inundations to cover
“ camps, which may be executed on almost
“ every spot with very little expense, and
“ would render them no less strong than
“ fortresses. All capital positions should, if
“ possible, be covered by inundations, which
“ are much more efficacious than all the
“ retrenchments in the world. The sluices
“ must be made as low as possible, and

* Lloyd, vol. ii. Preface, p. 28.

“ moreover, covered with some good work
 “ or other.”

As General Lloyd remarks, that all small rivers, or even rivulets, may be made serviceable to camps, and render positions as strong as fortifications, why should not we, my Lord, make use of this distinguished officer's abilities, and make this river an impenetrable fortress to the defence of our capital on the Essex side the Thames? I shall endeavour to point out the manner in which it may be executed. The enemy cannot pass over the marshes below Barking between that town and the river Thames, that part is totally out of the question; we will, therefore, first of all, study the defence of the river Roding, from Barking to Ilford, which is very simple as it is not fordable, and has only two bridges over it, which may very easily be defended. I propose, that a sluice shall be made and protected by a work at such a convenient spot, where the water begins to be shallow, and where the enemy might find a ford. By thus strength-

strengthening nature by art, that river might be rendered impassable by keeping the water equal with the banks, and would form an impassable barrier for many miles in extent farther up the country. This I shall treat of presently ; but shall return to the defence of that part between the two abovementioned towns, and from Ilford to the Henhault Forest, which lays on the other side of the river Roding to the east. The distance between Barking and Ilford is about one mile and a half, and the distance between Ilford and the Henhault Forest is barely two miles. If any military man will look to the large map of Essex, on a scale of two inches to a mile, sold by Mr. Faden, opposite Northumberland House, Strand, they will easily perceive, that the position may be much shortened between these two towns ; I mean, occupied by fewer troops posted behind the river, for about half a mile above Barking the river spreads into two branches ; the one branch runs through the town, the other in the rear of it ; between these two branches there is a marshy flat ;
 this

this makes the town doubly strong, and the river dividing itself above, shortens the position of the troops behind it, and requires fewer numbers to defend it.

Above Ilford there is a place called Aldersbrook, opposite to which a small rivulet, called Cranbrook Wash, empties itself into the river Roding. The space between that rivulet and the town of Ilford is about half a mile: this rivulet rises at the edge of the Henhault forest, over which there is a bridge called Bunter's-bridge, and another bridge lower down at Cranbrook. I propose, my Lord, that this Cranbrook rivulet should also be deepened by a sluice made as low as possible to the mouth of it, and protected also by a work. This rivulet, when deepened by the means of a sluice, will render the position, (which I intend to point out behind it for a considerable body of our troops) stronger and more formidable. If this rivulet cannot be dammed up so as to render it impassable near Bunter's-bridge, or above it, surely it may be made unfordable for a considerable
length

length near to the mouth, where it is discharged into the Roding. This will shorten the position behind it, as well as strengthen it; besides, a few heavy guns posted near to the Roding on our side will so effectually scour the approach to that rivulet between it and Ilford, that our troops posted behind the Cranbrook rivulet need fear nothing on their right flank, as it cannot well be attacked. They will naturally, therefore, be jealous of having their left flank turned; but this will be strongly guarded by the Henhault forest, in which all our light troops and riflemen * should be posted with a strong abattis before them, supported by some cannon and regulars. This would effectually protect our left flank; the right being secured, and an attack even in front being prevented by deepening the rivulet, the left might be re-inforced from the right wing, should the enemy attack us where the river cannot be made unfordable.

* Their use, and the want of them, I shall give in a separate chapter.

I am of opinion also, that even 1000 skilful marksmen placed in the forest behind an abatis, with a few pieces of cannon, could not without great difficulty be driven from their station, and would for a considerable time impede the progress of a very numerous body.

As the enemy, to effect a coup de main, could not bring any heavy cannon with them, and not many of any sort, we should have a most signal advantage over them, by placing heavy artillery on the most advantageous spots of ground between Barking and Ilford, and also behind the Cranbrook rivulet from the Roding river to the forest. For which purpose, there should be a park of artillery formed in Ilford and Barking, where the guns might lay without any more expense than is at present incurred at Woolwich, and might in one hour be planted on such places as the general officers might fix upon. There should also be at least 1000 broad axes at the same place, and several large timber saws, that in case the enemy
were

were found to be on their march to the metropolis, that the outskirts of the forest might be formed into an abattis. But should the worst come to the worst, and this part of our army be forced to retreat, by the enemy effecting a passage over the Cranbrook rivulet, (for I trust every military man will acknowledge, that a passage over the river Roding from Barking to Ilford cannot well be effected, with the troops or cannon planted in the manner I have described on the other side of the Roding) our army must give ground and take a fresh position; this position, if you will look to the map, is evident, *it points itself out, and stronger than the latter*, because the ground is by many degrees contracted, and, in its fullest extent, is not more than a mile in breadth; and when they come to the position our troops must take, (at Claybury, near Woodford Bridge) where they must attack us again, it is not three quarters of a mile from the river Roding to the skirts of the forest; between which and the Roding river there is a commanding ground in

the center, on each side of which there is not one quarter of a mile in space for the enemy to form their troops for the attack. Figure to yourself what destruction heavy cannon planted on this eminence would cause amongst the enemies ranks, whilst forming and advancing to a closer attack ; observe well also that this position is strongly flanked by the forest on the left flank, where our light troops and riflemen should all be posted, and from whence they might destroy thousands before they ever could come to attack the main body. The right flank is doubly guarded by the river Roding.

To render their endeavours abortive, I propose, after guarding the bridges over the Roding at Barking and Ilford, by strong corps and cannon, that the greater part of our troops posted between those towns, the moment they perceive the enemy have forced the Cranbrook rivulet, shall move by their left, pass through Lord Tilney's park at Wanstead, and gain the great road from Layton Stone to Woodford bridge, leaving

leaving Snarebrook to the left, and post themselves on this side of Ray House, the seat of Sir James Wright, at which place, a little higher up, about half a mile, there is a bridge over the Roding, by which they may pass over any body of troops to reinforce the other division of our army. As this bridge is half a mile in the rear of the position, our troops must occupy by Claybury, the distance even from the turnpike road near Ray House on the west side of the Roding, to the commanding ground in the front of Claybury, across that river, is not above half a mile; our cannon, there placed, must terribly annoy the left flank of the enemy. Farther, let it be observed, that the distance we shall have to march from Ilford to Ray House, is not above half a mile farther than the enemy will have to march to Claybury, after having forced the Cranbrook rivulet.

I confess, myself, that if I commanded one thousand riflemen, and was supported by an equal number of light troops, and

discretionary powers were allowed me, I would remain in the forest, and let them follow our army, and would perpetually attack their rear with such vigour, that they must detach at least three times my numbers to repulse me; and then it is a doubt to me whether they would be able to drive me out of the forest, and if they did, it would not be of much consequence, as my retreat would be always safe to Ilford or Barking, where I could pass the river under the protection of our covering troops; but I am certain if they should succeed, that I would make them pay very dear for the advantage. I mean even that were they to force the second position of our army at Claybury, which I do not think possible, and our troops were obliged to retreat to Loughton-bridge, about four miles higher up the river Roding, or to Abridge-bridge, about seven miles, to cross that river, where they would have the other division of our army to receive them, and assist their passage, that *I would even then* remain behind with the abovementioned number of riflemen and light troops, and act as I proposed before.

before. Indeed, if our general who commanded the army should judge it proper, he might march a body of troops over the Roding, through Ilford, and attack the enemy in the rear, as they attempted to force our troops behind the Cranbrook rivulet. These troops in their rear, others in their front over the Cranbrook rivulet, and the riflemen and light troops on their right flank in the edge of the forest, would place them in a very perilous situation.

To effect the defence of the capital, it is, in my opinion, that the army which lay at Brighton last year, would be placed to greater advantage; the greater part in Essex, in addition to the number that were at Warley Common before, and the remainder of them in Kent, with a considerable additional force also. My reasons why a considerable force should be stationed in Essex and Kent, I shall give in its proper place. And as these two bodies of troops might effectually move to the support of each other, there should be a number of flat-bottomed boats and scows placed

placed on the Thames : I think Gravesend too low down, it would be better higher up, and certainly not lower than Greys Tharrock or St. Clements, which is opposite to Green Hith; but let those who are more conversant in the navigation and passage of the river determine, as the setting of the tides should be well considered where the boats and scows should lay; certain it is, *that such a communication* between the two bodies of troops is absolutely necessary, and it should be not too low down the river.

I am perfectly convinced that this position which I have pointed out, is much to be improved on by officers of superior abilities and experience; and I am equally aware, that great men seldom adopt the ideas of their inferiors, and should not be so particular nor so prolix, if I were not determined to point out every other position that might be taken for the defence of this essential and material spot. In case that the grand defence which I have pointed out for the pro-

tection of the capital, may be thought *worthy the attention* of those whose duty it certainly is to attend to it, I shall therefore point out another position, which I believe is full as strong, if not stronger than the one I have already fully defined. There is a spot of ground named Havering Bower on the left, and to the east of Henhault Forest. I will describe it; near to it there is a commanding ground, on which a battery of cannon may be placed, not half a mile from the forest, at Havering Park, in the front of Havering Bower; and there are other commodious grounds that effectually command the approach to this position, and will render it inattackable if they are advantageously occupied. These positions are near two places Brick Hill and Bedford's. Between the forest and Havering Park the ground is not broader than three quarters of a mile; and between Havering Park and Brick Hill, and between Brick Hill and Bedford's between neither, is there space of above half a mile; indeed, there is an eminence on the front of Havering

Havering Park * and Brick Hill (only a few hundred yards) which effectually curtails this part of the position; in front of which place is Collier Row Common, that approaches this ground and Havering Park, and also is within cannon shot of Brick Hill; this is a dead flat, which renders our position the stronger. Cavalry might be posted to advantage behind these abovementioned commanding grounds, so as to fall forth, should the enemy be found in confusion, and charge them on this common, where they might act to effect.

On this ground, and at the former mentioned position behind the Cranbrook rivulet, the greater part of our army might be stationed, taking care strongly to occupy the intermediate forest, † as I am of opinion that

* This ground has no particular name, therefore I must refer the reader to the large map of Essex, or to the ground itself.

† General Lloyd remarks, vol. ii. p. “ Never approach a wood or a mountain, unless you occupy it entirely; it is a rule that must be for ever observed, and cannot be transgressed without imminent danger.”

a very

a very few troops, jointly with the armed citizens, would effectually guard the passes of the river Roding, at Barking and Ilford. But, my Lord, should the enemy attempt this circuitous approach to the capital, it will totally render a coup de main abortive.

My reasons for having been so minutely descriptive is, that I intend to shew the farther efficacy of this position, should the enemy attempt a more solid invasion in force against the capital, by the way of the county of Essex, which in its due place I shall refer to; I shall therefore for the present quit Essex, and turn my views to the county of Kent. I cannot leave this subject without endeavouring to impress more strongly the utility of an intrenched camp, and to prove how necessary and how essential it is. All experienced generals judge, that strong positions should be assisted by art; no army in Germany ever takes up a position, intending to remain there for so short a space as three or four weeks (and often for a much shorter time) without immediately erecting batteries

H

and

and breastworks on all the roads leading to their camp, and at other feeble places liable to be attacked. Surely we are more doubly bound to make that position strong on which we are to fight for the empire.

KENT.

K E N T.

ALTHOUGH I have deviated considerably in this publication from my original intent, that being only to treat of a coup de main against the capital, yet I shall not go much farther on this side the Thames on the Kentish side, because I am not so fully master of the ground to speak of operations in force, as I feel I am on the other side the river. I look on it next to an impossibility that the enemy could effect a coup de main against London on this side the river, if a body of troops were stationed in some central position in Kent, from whence they might act on either side the river, and be supported by those in Essex passing the Thames; but to my utter astonishment in the year 1794, there were not a single encampment in Kent contiguous to the capital. I have been more particular in my remarks on the other side, where I con-

ceive it was easy to be effected in the state that the country has been left.

When I say I think it impossible that the enemy can take possession of the capital by a coup de main on this side the Thames, had there been any body of troops to oppose them, it is proper I should explain and give my reasons.

On an expedition that requires so much rapidity in execution, they never could bring heavy artillery, shells or carcasses with them; they therefore could not even burn the city from the opposite shore, nor could they ever pass over the bridges to take it, if they were strongly barricaded. No enemy could be so hardy as to attempt such a daring and desperate attack, a few barrels of gunpowder placed in the cellars of the houses, near to the bridges, would bury half their forces in the ruins, and operate to as great an effect as the best mine made by the most able engineer; therefore they must move higher up the river many miles, till they
came

came to some place where it would be found fordable; this would give time for our forces to collect and oppose their passage wherever they might attempt it, and would totally render any coup de main ineffectual.

But it may be said they would destroy the Borough of Southwark! To which I reply, that should they be able to come even so far unopposed (for as yet *I have not supposed any resistance to be made*, even till they arrive on the opposite shore to the capital) they undoubtedly would burn it, and if they did, they would not be in the least degree nearer possessing the capital. Southwark destroyed, would be a considerable national loss, the same as any other opulent town destroyed also would be, but it would not subject us to the dictating laws of the enemy, nor would it render us as little better than a province to France; no, it is only the capital in the enemy's possession that can ruin us as a nation. The safety of London is the grand object we ought most materially to attend to, and to place it in such a state of security that

may bid defiance to any invading enemy, should they either attempt a landing by a coup de main, or in force.

It is not my intent that so very large a body of troops should be placed in Kent and Essex as to draw off all relief from other opulent places in this island: no, I only mean to shew, and I hope I have proved, that the capital was left in such a defenceless state in the year 1794, which I trust to God we never shall see it in again; for there was not 4000 men at Warley, in Essex; and what is more astonishing, not a single man in Kent, (I mean not a single encampment.)* Although it is highly necessary, if the enemy should attempt any operation against any particular place at a distance from the capital, that we should march an army to its relief; yet I caution government to leave a certain force both in Essex and Kent, that may be judged sufficient to protect London, lest the enemy, by causing a diversion in the absence

* I am not certain whether there was not some small force on the *coast* of Kent, but whether there was or was not, that could not have been of any use to the defence of the capital.

sence of those troops, may attempt a blow of more consequence to them, and that never can be recovered by us,

I judge it absolutely necessary that nearly the same precautions should be taken on the Kentish side as I have pointed out on the Essex; and above all an entrenched camp, to which our army, if worsted, might retreat to, and to which every citizen, armed, should fly to. This position, I think, should be near Shooter's Hill and Eltham, as through those two places the great roads pass.

I own that I have not made myself sufficiently master of that spot, to point out the exact and strongest position, as I am in hopes I have done on the other side in Essex; but can affirm, that the ground is so immensely strong by nature, that by a small assistance from art, there are positions, where, if the enemy should attempt to pass, that 20,000 men would repulse three times their numbers. I think whatever diversion the enemy may attempt in any part of our island,
that

that there never should be less than 15,000 men left in Essex and Kent, and so enabled, that each body might pass the Thames by boats and scows stationed at a proper place, mutually to assist each other, on which ever side the river the enemy might think fit to land. I think 20,000 would be more prudent, if we could spare so many from any other place that might be attacked; I am of opinion it may be done, considering the numerous force we have in arms, and reflecting that this place is the grand primary object beyond all others.

I must particularly request your Lordship's attention to one point, which, of all others, is *of the greatest importance*, and which, as yet, I have not mentioned: when from the inclemency of the autumn, troops can no longer lay in camp, under canvas, *that is the very time* when the enemy are most likely *to attempt* a blow against the capital, by the river Thames; therefore, my Lord, it is absolutely necessary that the body of troops which may be judged sufficient

ficient for the defence of the capital, should not, when the camps are broke up, be disposed to various and distant parts of the island, but should be quartered or cantoned as contiguous as possible to the essential points of defence on both sides of the Thames ; so that even in one hour, a considerable body might be found able to act at the most essential points of defence, and that the whole force might also in a very short space of time be assembled at their proper alarm posts pointed out for them.

I hope, my Lord, I shall be pardoned, if unfortunately and unintentionally I should mistake the following case ; I do not assert it, but declare upon my word that I believe it to be true, and nearly as I shall relate it : When the camp abovementioned, at Warley, broke up, I understand the regiments that formed it were not quartered any where contiguous to the capital in Essex, but were sent to various and distant parts of the island. If this be true, *the capital absolutely was left without any defence whatever, at the very*

I

time

time of the year which was *the most likely* and best suited for an invasion in the Thames, to the *mercy of the enemy*; for there was nothing but the guards, who were dispersed all over the capital, to defend it.

I am of opinion, my Lord, that if ever the French attempt to land near the capital in the Thames, to attempt it by a coup de main, they will come when our camps *are broke up*, in the long and dark nights, or in the spring of the year, when the easterly winds prevail and blow strong, *before our camps are formed*: in summer, when there is little or no darkness, it is not so probable.

I have read a production published some years past, by a friend of mine, which I truly admire, from the great and laudable attention he has paid to the general defence of this country; in one part it speaks of a particular high and commanding ground (the Windmill Hill) near Gravesend, and recommends a work to be made on it. A
work

work there might be, of great use, and would certainly hinder the enemy from approaching the capital by the great turnpike road close to Gravesend, as that hill fully commands the road. But the enemy may turn this work, and leave it to their right, by turning off from Shorne, by the way of Cobham, by Lord Darnley's park, which is only three miles and a half distant from Gravesend, to the right of that town. The road, though not so broad as the turnpike, is hard and good, and is used by heavy corn waggons, &c. in their way to and from Rochester. By this road they may pass to Shinglewell, and from thence to Swanfcome; from whence they may very shortly get into the great turnpike road again. I am well acquainted with this particular part of Kent, as I have for four years successively been a partridge shooting all over those parts; from Gravesend to the banks of the Medway, by the way of Cobham; and from the Cliff and Higham marches, contiguous to the Hope in the Thames to the Medway;

also near to Hoo. Moreover, they need not go so far round as Cobham, to avoid the Windmill Hill, for they may turn off to their left before they come to Chalk, and gain the road by Shinglewell, which, as abovementioned, will lead them again into the turnpike road.

After declaring that I am well acquainted with this country, it may be deemed improper that I do not give a more decisive opinion on the actual points of defence. I do most candidly and fully own that I find myself wanting in ability, and not able to give a decisive opinion, as fully as I have on the Effex side, and therefore do not chuse to give an opinion on a subject that I am conscious requires the abilities of officers of greater experience and knowledge than I possess. As there are so many different points to be considered on this side the Thames, which are not requisite on the other, that I own I am not master enough of the subject to decide, I shall therefore only describe particular

cular parts in this district, and leave it to more experienced officers, who may be ordered to examine this county, to decide on the proper positions for the defence. The two works I have already proposed, one near Yarlands, and the other lower down, more south, and nearly opposite to East Tilbury, I think will not only prevent the enemy's fleet from lying in the Hope, but also hinder their landing troops from the Hope on the Kentish side. In this district, (after having secured the Hope) the enemy can only land in Cliff marshes, or Cowley marshes, which will be a most arduous task, and I think next to an impossibility; for if we had any troops contiguous, were they even to land, they never could come out of these marshes and form a single battalion, as they might be operated on both with cannon and small arms, on both flanks and front.

I will now describe the ground between these two marshes, and the banks of the river Medway. The distance from the banks

of the Medway to Cowley, is barely two miles; and the distances from Cliff and Higham to the Medway are, from the former, two miles and a half, the latter, about two miles and three quarters; within the space of *this gorge, they must pass somewhere*, before they can gain the great road to Gravesend, and there are many very strong positions on the ways they will be *obliged* to pass, before they can gain the great turnpike road leading by Gravesend.

I have already confessed that the defence of this district is beyond my judgment, and shall content myself by remarking, that if we prevent their landing in the Hope, that they will never attempt to land on this side the Medway. Indeed, the island of Grean might be occupied by the enemy, but to no purpose, for there are but one or two roads from off that isle, and these are all over a most extensive marsh, at the end of which the ground is so commanding, that two thousand men might stop a whole army; in fact, they cannot move from this island but
by

by one road, which comes out by Osterlana. As the other two roads over this marsh, the one to the north, near Allhallows, the other to the south west, near Hoo, are so exposed in flank, and not half a mile distant from the commanding ground, that our cannon would destroy their column before they ever could arrive, either at the one place or the other, where they then would have to contend with a part of our army. In short, if opposed at all, they cannot pass; and therefore, as I have said before, the enemy occupying this island would be useless; and my reason for having described it so particularly, is not from any danger that I imagine may arrive from that quarter, but only to shew that I have been attentive, in general, to every spot of ground near this district.

Let us therefore turn back to the Medway, and examine that river. The enemy can never keep possession of that river, so as to form a harbour or anchorage for their shipping, unless they can command both banks of it from Sheerness to Chatham.

This

This is impossible, if we have any forces in that neighbourhood; and I judge it to be full as necessary that at least 3000 men should always be stationed close to Gravesend (with a farther force in the rear of them, at some convenient place between the capital) as it is necessary that 3000 men, which I have stated, should ever be stationed near to East Tilbury, and Mucking on the Essex side.

Let any officer look at the northern banks of the Medway, from Finsbury to Hoo, and then judge if it is possible for even a single vessel to lay in that river between these two towns, much less surely a fleet. But supposing they should come into the Medway lower down by Kitts Hole, from whence they may also be driven out, which is not necessary to relate here, for reasons which I shall presently give, they never can attempt the capital by a coup de main; for surely our troops must be asleep if they let them pass the Medway over Rochester bridge; therefore to pass that river they must
march

march near to Maidstone, before ever they they could find a passage; this distance is very far, and would totally destroy the effect of a coup de main; and should they land in force, we shall have time enough to assemble a sufficient force to oppose them; besides, we shall have, as proposed, an entrenched camp for that part of our army, should they be worsted, to retreat to, near Shooter's Hill, for near to this place and Eltham they must pass, should they land in *any one part of Kent whatever.*

But one obstacle more should be considered relative to their occupying the Medway in force, which must effectually prevent them; the Nore, and the mouth of the Thames, are contiguous, at which place our eastern fleet of men of war should ever rendezvous and have their station. For as I have already observed, that when the wind blows strong at east, they *cannot come out of the Downs*, nor can they, when the same wind prevails, dare attempt a passage to the Thames when *they lay in Yarmouth Roads*;

K

therefore

therefore surely it must be acknowledged, that the *most proper rendezvous for our eastern fleet is in the mouth of the Thames.** I cannot conceive any place so well calculated as this, but it *never has* been judged necessary *as yet*; but I most sincerely hope it will, as a fleet of men of war in the mouth of the Thames will be *one great security* to the capital, and it is *absolutely necessary* that a fleet should be *stationed there*. But, my Lord, let us not trust to that alone, but adopt other measures also, that in the absence of that fleet we may have nothing to fear for the safety of London.

I shall now, my Lord, quit the county of Kent, and turn my thoughts to more extensive operations in force, and also to desultory invasions from the enemy.

* I am informed that there is a channel called the Swin, between Harwich and the Nore, where men of war may lay, unless it absolutely blows a hurricane.

GENERAL

GENERAL REFLECTIONS.

HAVING now totally concluded as far as a coup de main may affect the capital, I shall make some general reflections on an invasion, undertaken *in force* by the enemy. I have already given my reasons for the safety of Portsmouth, as it cannot be taken by a coup de main, nor is it likely to be attacked whilst any part of our fleet lay at Spithead, therefore it does not require an army to cover that place; a few regular troops, with arms sufficient to arm the Dock-yard Men and Inhabitants, to man the works, will be sufficient, as we shall always have time enough to collect and march any force to the relief of it. I hope, therefore, I may be allowed, with justice, to consider this place in less danger than others I shall mention. As my mind has ever been attentive to the safety of the capital, being convinced that it is the only place where the enemy can give a mor-

tal stab to our constitution, as every other place, though great the immediate loss of it might be, yet it would only be a temporary and partial one which might be recovered, I shall point out the only places I can possibly imagine that the enemy can land at. If they should come in great force with an intent to march to London, I trust every officer will be candid enough to acknowledge, that the enemy can never attempt to land *in force* without taking possession of some spacious and safe harbour for their shipping and stores, for they must form a depot from whence their army must be fed; at which place they must also land a quantity of provisions and military stores of all sorts. I can only find out two harbours from whence they could attempt to execute their project against the capital; these are Harwich and the river Thames. If any officer can point out another, I will thank him. I acknowledge that the enemy may come up the Medway, but to possess and occupy it for a time, and make it as a harbour for their stores and provisions, is very different to
 what

what the Dutch once did in a moment of absurd gasconade, which ended in no one advantage whatever to them ; let any officer examine well the banks of the Medway from the mouth of that river to Chatham, they will find that if we have the command of either shore, no fleet can possibly lay there ; a few travelling heavy guns would compel every ship to slip her cables and fly. I give the preference, I confess, by far, to the latter, as Harwich is 72 miles from London, and parts in the Thames are but 28 and 30 odd. There is another material point to be observed, the greater distance of the one, for supposing they were in possession of Harwich, and were absolutely advanced 50 miles towards London, they must be fed from Harwich, and I am confident if we did not oppose them totally in front, but act on their flanks and on their line of communication with their depot, we should oblige them to march back or starve ; for I trust we should take such effectual measures as to hinder them feeding any part even of their army from the country. As I speak no longer, my Lord,

on a coup de main, but relative to more solid operations *in force* against the capital, I shall endeavour more fully to prove of what essential consequence it is to us as a nation to establish an entrenched camp, with a few works and batteries, at the grand position I have pointed out at, and near to Barking and Ilford, and the Henhault forest, and also one on the Kent side of the Thames; do not misconceive me, it is not my intent to put my country to the expense of 200,000l. in regular fortifications; No! My intent extends no further than erecting a few batteries on particular and advantageous spots at those places, which may be done at a very trifling expense, which is no more than a drop of water in the sea compared to the magnitude of the loss of our capital, or, I am sorry to say, the useless expense in fortifications in various parts of this island. I am vain enough to imagine that I have fixed on a spot, at which, if properly guarded, we may defy the enemy's attempt on the capital should they land in the Thames on the Essex side, either to effect a *coup de main*, or, in an invasion *in force*; and I hope to be able

to

to prove also, that should the enemy even take possession of Harwich, and from thence attempt a solid move *in force* to London, that they cannot avoid passing this spot in their way to the capital, without subjecting themselves to such disadvantages that, if we are tolerably judicious, must end in utter ruin, famine, destruction, or a precipitate retreat to their army. For instance, my Lord, the direct road from Harwich to London is by Colchester, Witham, Chelmsford, Ingatestone to Rumford; if the enemy should take this road, which is the best and the most direct, I hope every military man will allow, that they cannot approach the capital without forcing the fortified camp near Ilford, behind and near to the river Roding. Should they be informed of our having strongly guarded this pass, and conceive it next to madness to attempt to force it, and yet should persist in their approach to the capital, the only road I know that they can possibly take is, when they arrive near to Chelmsford, they must turn off to their right by the rout of Chipping Ongar, from whence
they

they will pass to Epping, and from Epping through that difficult forest where there is but one road, and the whole a perpetual defile, with twenty intervening strong positions, all which are next to inattackable.*

But should they take it into their heads (which I sincerely and devoutly wish they would in such a case) to pass over the river Lee, near to Waltham Holy Cross, about 6 miles to the west of Epping, I think when they are once on their journey they may as well take Lincoln or York in their way to London, for one is just as possible as the other, which I will prove.

For instance, if they only make the detour by Chipping Ongar to Epping, this will give them near 30 miles more in distance, which added to 72, will increase the distance from

* They will then have to pass the river Lee, behind which there is even stronger positions to be found than the one I have pointed out behind the Roding—over the river Lee, that part of our army which is opposed to them in front, will always have a safe and easy retreat.

Harwich

Harwich to London to 100 miles. Now that celebrated officer, General Lloyd, gives it as his firm opinion, that an army of only 40,000, placed in any position in any country, and distant only fifty miles from their depot, from which and from whence only they can draw subsistence (which must be the case with the French were they to move from Harwich); that without any force whatever opposed to them, they could not remain three weeks in that spot, but must starve, or go back to meet their convoys.

Now, my Lord, figure to yourself the many and insurmountable obstacles they would find in a march of one hundred miles, with a large army, opposed by a numerous force which we surely would have time to collect; say, that they come with 60,000, and we oppose them with fifty; General Lloyd says in this case, divide your army into five parts, leave three fifths to oppose them in front, and send the other two to operate on their flank and rear, and on their line of communication with their depot: he

also says, that a convoy of 3,000 waggons will take up a distance of thirty miles, and require above 20,000 men to protect it, of course half that number will take up half the distance and half the number of men.

Now, say, for argument sake, that the enemy are arrived near to Epping, and we leave 30,000, to oppose them in front, and send 20,000, or even only 10,000 men, by the way of Ilford to Rumford, and from thence to Chelmsford or to Chipping Ongar, which is directly in their rear and on their line of communication with their depot at Harwich; I say, my Lord, they must retreat or starve, and every step they advance from Epping, the further will they advance to their own destruction. That part of our army opposed to them in front must skirmish and annoy often, but never deliver decisive battle; on this point General Lloyd most particularly cautions us.

Thus situated, I would wish to see them advanced even as far as Laytonstone or Woodford,

ford, for I really believe they never could get back ; all communication with their depot being cut off by our detached corps, they must starve ; they would never attempt it, but retreat the moment they found they could not maintain and keep up their line of communication.

I write this only to prove, that we need not be much alarmed if the enemy should be in possession of Harwich, and attempt a move to London ; and to impress deeply on the mind of every wealthy citizen, and to every other true lover of his country's opulence, how material and how absolutely necessary it is to the safety of the capital, that every means, both by water and land, should be exerted to *hinder the enemy landing in the Thames*, for there they can land within twenty-eight miles of London ; and I repeat again, *that in the state the capital was left in the year 1794, so small a body as 15,000 men might have landed and marched without opposition to it, and before ever the army at Brighton could have moved twenty*

miles to its protection, they would have done their business, and would have been on the return to their shipping.

The Thames is the place that we should be most jealous of; I warn the city of London of their danger, and intreat them, if they have any regard for their own interest and wealth, and for the glory and welfare of their country, to cause such steps to be taken which will effectually prevent the misery; and this may easily be done, but if neglected, the citizens may some morning be awakened by the French Grenadiers singing the Marfellois March and Ca Ira, at the Mansion-house, which, I imagine, would not be so agreeable to their ears, as a Christmas carol, or an Easter hymn.

I have heard it given as an opinion by naval officers of experience, that the enemy may come over in small craft, and haul them up high and dry on shore; I well know they can, our fishermen do the same every day on the sea coasts: but if they did land after

this method, they must, if they come on any solid expedition *in force*, halt, at least, where they did land, for the space of ten days, to fortify, intrench, and erect batteries at that spot, so as not only to protect their small craft, but the stores and provisions they must also land.

During this time we should be enabled to concentrate our forces to oppose them, for surely they would not attempt any *solid move to an advanced distance* into the country, and leave all their craft without works to protect them, for a part of our army only might burn their vessels, and then theirs would be truly a forlorn hope; for if ever defeated they would have no retreat whatever.

In this manner they might land to burn a fishing town on the coast, or any town a few miles from the shore, but surely never could attempt any solid expedition.

I shall now, my Lord, with the most profound respect, ask your Lordship and the Body Corporate of the city of London, and
those

those of monied interest and wealth, whether a proper defence has been made for the safety of the capital, where our power, our wealth, our consequence, nay more, *our existence as a great nation, is concentrated*; when I inform you, *that in the year 1794, there was not 4,000 troops at Warley common, in Essex, and not a single cannon in Essex, or nearer to the points of defence I have pointed out than Woolwich, and not one single soldier in Kent contiguous to the capital; no men of war in the mouth of the Thames, no floating batteries, gallies, or fireships, stationary at the Hope, or near to it, or near to the mouth of the Thames; and that army, which was the most contiguous to the capital, and most able to march to the relief of it, was at Brighton, fifty-six miles distant; nay more, my Lord, when our camps broke up in the autumn (the very time of all others we should most expect the enemy in the Thames) the few troops we had in Essex were dispersed, and nothing but the Guards, who are ever scattered over London, left to protect it.*

If your Lordship thinks that the above measures have been sufficient for the security of the capital, I shall lament the pains I have taken in attempting to prove to you the contrary ; but I have the vanity to think, that your Lordship's well-known abilities, and the good sense and perspicuity of the city of London, *will induce both you and them (as well as all military men) to acquiesce in my assertions, that the capital in the year 1794, even since the French have been in possession of Holland, has been left in a defenceless state.*

I have said in the former part of this book that I hoped to be able to point out a place where the enemy must pass before they can approach the capital, on the Essex shore—I am bold enough to assert that I have, for if they attempt to pass the river Roding by a circuitous march, the effect of a coup de main is totally destroyed, as we shall gain time and be able to collect our forces ; and should they land in force and attempt the capital

capital by the way of Chipping Ongar and Epping, I have fully shewn how this position obliges them to make that immense detour which must prove their utter destruction and ruin. .

I still persist and will maintain, that in the situation the capital was left in the year 1794, 15,000 men might have landed at the Hope and have burned it, as there was not 4,000 men at Warley Common, nor was there any force by water that could have impeded their progress, nor any obstacle, besides what I have already mentioned by land, that I know of.

My Lord, an Elizabeth Canning, a Cock-lane Ghost, (which took up the attention of many of our divines) or a mad Prophet, may take off the attention of the people from the political wheel; but let not the city of London be lulled into a false belief of their security, by undervaluing the enterprise of the enemy, or by a false conception of their own strength; let them awake, see their danger,

danger, take proper steps to prevent it, and then boldly face the invading enemy.

Let every zealous citizen, who has a gun in his house, fly to his arms and repair to the river Roding, or to the entrenched camp, in Kent, there will they find revelation, for at these spots will be revealed to them the true and effectual defence of their capital; and those persons would have required a more clear vindication of their conduct, to whom the safety of the capital in the year 1794, was entrusted (if such a fatality had happened), than the vindications wrote in favour of a mad and blaspheming Prophet, by a more mad Member of Parliament.

As this deluded town seems at present fond of paying much attention to scriptural extracts, instead of attending to the safety of the capital, I will give them one—"Our
Saviour sayeth, he that hath not a sword
let him sell his garment and buy one."—
 Prepare yourselves, fellow countrymen, and should the French land—*Britons to arms,*

to arms, I exhort you, fly to the entrenched camps, there contend for every thing that is as dear to you as your lives ; for what advantage or pleasure can you enjoy in life, after your property is annihilated and your families beggared.

Although very few people in this town have firelocks and bayonets in their possession, yet there is hardly an individual (excepting the poorer sort) who has not a fowling piece in his possession. Permit me to assure your Lordship, that a common fowling piece (with a flask of powder and a bag of bullets,) is not only very useful but a formidable weapon, especially behind an unfordable river, and in redoubts or entrenchments, or even in a close and intersected country.— In action the bullets may be placed in the waistcoat pocket, for want of a cartridge box. Witness, my Lord, the affair of Bunker's Hill ; the arms the Americans fought with that day were only common guns, that each inhabitant kept to defend his house ; there were, indeed, amongst the Americans,

Americans, some few unwieldly old Queen Anne's muskets, and several long duck guns but very few rifles, and fewer, if any, regular soldiers' arms. Their works and entrenchments also were thrown up in great haste, irregular, and not planned by any engineer, they chiefly consisted of the railing of the country, piled up, and filled, some with hay and some with earth, with a simple bank raised behind to fire over, but that day they contrived to kill and wound near 1,000 of our soldiers and 94 officers.

With what greater advantage would the inhabitants of London oppose the enemy behind an unfordable river (the Roding on the Essex side) or in a well-constructed entrenched camp near Shooter's Hill, in Kent, supported in both counties by a powerful artillery and a body of regular troops. Were proper measures of defence adopted on both sides the river Thames, we should be invincible.

There is nothing we should so much guard against as a sudden panic seizing *any* body

of men. If we shew the inhabitants of London the danger they have been exposed to, and at the same time point out to them their security, and plainly evince to them, that at such positions already mentioned on each side the river, they may, both with safety, success, and honor, defend the capital; I am confident, my Lord, every man who wishes well to his country, will readily and cheerfully repair to those places; but if no place, whatever, shall be pointed out on both sides the river Thames for the armed inhabitant to repair to protect the city, I am convinced, that if the French were ever to land in the Thames, that eight tenths of the inhabitants would desert the capital, and carry all their property they could with them to the westward: This would be a day of great profit for the trustees of the western turnpikes if they could collect the toll, but a woful one to the cities of London and Westminster.

But, my Lord, if we prove to the inhabitants of London and Westminster (which is
the

the intent of my having been most particular in not only exhorting them to fly to arms, but having used every power I possess to prove to them, that if proper measures are taken by government to render certain positions on each side the river Thames, already most strong by nature, more stronger by art) the contrary effect will be produced; for, excepting some innate irrecoverable cowards (to whom, if for every pound they weigh a pound was to be added for every fear, a waggon and eight horses could not draw them out of their lurking holes, or carry their worthless carcases out of the city) every other inhabitant would with scorn and disdain, scout the ideas of an ignominious and destructive flight; they would feel and be convinced of their own powers and strength, and would, undoubtedly, foresee the *absolute, certain, and only means* of securing their wealth and property, and their families from ruin and beggary, would be to fly to arms, and repair to the entrenched positions I have pointed out and judge necessary to be taken into immediate consideration.

My

My abilities have not enabled me to find out any other places more proper or stronger than those I have mentioned ; but if officers of superior abilities, who may be commanded to survey the counties of Essex and Kent, may find out *others* better suited to the defence of the capital, I shall rejoice much.

I trust, my Lord, that no man can be so ignorant or so absurd, as to believe, that the French nation are not as well acquainted both with the strong and weak parts in our island as we are ; many years past that celebrated and distinguished officer General Lloyd, was employed by the court of France to make the survey of our coasts, disguised in the character of a Priest, since that, my Lord, from the various intelligent French officers, that in times of peace have traversed this island in every direction, they have had further advantages of acquiring knowledge.—Further, my Lord, I will inform you, that some of our most able and experienced draftsmen and engineers, were ordered to survey our coasts, and *that those very identical*

charts (before the present war commenced) *were sent to Paris to be engraved.* I have heard the reason given that it was to save expense in the engraving, which is very dear in this country ; the laudable system of economy I shall ever admire in every administration.

My Lord, I have endeavoured to explain in how defenceless a State the capital was in the year 1794, and at the same time, I trust I have doubly proved how little we have to fear from the enemy, provided proper precautions are taken for the defence of the capital, the safety of which is the grand object I ever have looked to.

But if we do not chuse to lock the door, when it is so fully in our power so to do, *the steed may be stolen.* Pegasus himself could not carry the enemy so speedily to the completion of their intended career of military glory as the possession of our capital would. France is not opposed to any power that can so materially distress her as we can ; therefore she
has

has a right to be more jealous of us than of any other nation, and to direct and turn her utmost exertions against this country ; she respects our power, though she deprecates our councils ; of Britain she must (and with justice) be jealous, and will endeavour, by every means in her power, to distress and degrandise us as a nation ; against us she will use every exertion ; she conceives herself aggrieved ; we, therefore, should be more doubly guarded.

PLYMOUTH.

PLYMOUTH.

THE situation of this place has been so justly and ably handled by Gen. Lloyd, that I shall not attempt any remarks on it, I refer the reader to his works ; but I cannot help remarking, that I am concerned to see such eminent abilities prostituted, in proving to us that it is utterly impossible for the enemy, should they ever take Plymouth, to march from thence to London : indeed, it requires no ghost from the dead to confirm us of that, as the meanest capacity must see the absolute impossibility. Let me only ask your Lordship, if you were obliged to walk to Paris, would you land at Dieppe, which, I believe, is the nearest port to the capital, or would you land at Helvoet Sluys, or even Antwerp, and walk through Holland and Brabant to Paris, for this is the comparative fact, relative to Plymouth. Plymouth is above 200 miles from the capital, and there are places which I have pointed out in the Thames under 30.—

General Lloyd seems to think, that, after the enemy had taken Plymouth they might advance as far as Haldon-Hill, where, from the strength of the position, they might be enabled to keep a large part of Devonshire, and make incursions into Cornwall. I am of opinion that thirty thousand stand of arms, sent by way of Bath and Bristol, for which, if a passage by land was not to be attempted, might easily be effected by water, and distributed amongst that hardy and numerous body of miners in Cornwall, would effectually hinder the French from ever maintaining a position for any space of time, even at so short a distance as forty miles from Plymouth; this body of miners acting on their line of communication with their depot, which must be Plymouth, from whence they must be fed, together with the regular force we could otherwise oppose to them, would shortly oblige them to retreat to their depot, or starve. Their attempting to conquer Cornwall, and every part west of Plymouth, were the people supplied with arms, would be absurd, and will not hold one moment's argument;

argument; any person who has ever been in that country, must be convinced of the absurdity of the attempt; I do, most truly, believe, that the miners, *without any regulars* to assist them, would, in that intricate country (in which there is not a single road that is not a perpetual and continued defile, commanded on each side by the most craggy mountains) ruin any force they could detach.

I shall finish on the subject of Plymouth by remarking, that if it ever were to be in the hands of the enemy, it would be a severe and heavy loss to the country, but far from an irrecoverable injury; that incident could not conquer us as a nation, and make us a province to France—No.—It is the capital only in their hands that can totally ruin us as a nation; any other place whatever, though of great consequence, can but be accounted as a partial loss, which time might repair, but the destruction of the capital can never be repaired or forgotten; for we should be no longer a nation of any consequence.

HARWICH.

I HAVE not been at this place these five years, then it was not in a proper state of defence; what has been done since I am not informed. It certainly might very easily be put in a proper state of defence, and at a very small expense—then the troops that have been stationed near to it, if arms were deposited in the town, to arm the dock-yard men, artificers, inhabitants, and merchant seamen, it would be impregnable, until we could march an army to its relief.—Land-guard Fort should have too months salt provisions and biscuit; for, without it, in twelve hours it must capitulate, which would give the enemy the entire possession of the harbour, otherwise they could not, even if in possession of the town.—But let it be observed, that they may land about five miles south of the town.

Floating

Floating Batteries, Galleys, Gun-Boats, and Fire-Ships.

THE construction of these I shall surrender to experienced officers of the navy and artillery, and shall only remark, that they are absolutely necessary to the defence of the Thames, and also, that they must *positively be stationary* at the places of defence. I have seen a galley in the American war, constructed by that distinguished officer (my friend Captain Kieth Elphinston, now Sir Kieth Elphinston) which was ballasted with water casks, so that if she was shot through and through, it was not possible to sink her. Galleys in shallow water are very useful and formidable, and at Long Shot, where a ship cannot approach them, will, with a spring on their cable, drive a man of war from her anchorage; we should have some for the defence of the Thames, and they should not draw above three feet water; so that they might

might pass over many shoals, and even sand banks at high water. The watermen on the Thames are very numerous, and should be compelled, in case of an invasion, instantly to repair to proper places of rendezvous, down the river, where they might be used to great effect.

Jægers,

Jægers, Sharp Shooters, Chasseurs.

THE above, all come under the denomination of riflemen and marksmen ; they are the most useful troops of any I know, and are most formidable from their destructive fire in a close and intricate country, and in broken ground, where they cannot be forced or compelled to a close action by a vigorous attack. To keep an out-post, or to maintain a position behind a rivulet, or any other strong defence ; no troops can excel them. —The French have several regiments of these troops ; they have found them to be the most useful of any in partial events ; our army in Brabant have experienced the want of them ; we have none in our army at home. I have served in such a corps, and, with truth, can say, that with a few hundred men, we have covered the rear guard of a whole column of regular troops, on their march, for the greater part of a day, and have not had
above

above five or six men killed or wounded, although perpetually in fire, when, I am certain, that if any one regular regiment had performed the same service, they must have lost above one third of the regiment. Such troops would be found very useful in case of an invasion, and especially in the counties of Essex and Kent, where the ground is very strong, inclosed and intersected—a *very large body* of such troops might have been raised at a *much less expense* than it has cost to raise a few county light cavalry; the use for which, I must confess, I am at a loss to find out, for we had enough of them before; should the enemy land, they could only be employed in driving off the cattle, &c. &c. from the coasts, as it is not likely that the enemy should come on purpose to fight our cavalry on Salisbury Plains, or Newmarket Heath, and I know of no other place where they could act to great advantage. Both in Essex and Kent the county is so inclosed they could not—I must lament that that useful and formidable body of troops, the real British Dragoons, instead of being augmented,

mented has latterly been reduced by several regiments of them being turned into light cavalry, they are able to charge most; if not all foreign, heavy cavalry can make a rapid march, and if required, dismount and fight on foot, and are the best and most useful troops we have.—I am of opinion, my Lord, that a large body of marksmen might be raised in every, or any county, and particularly in London, without *any expense* whatever, except their arms; to receive no pay, except when on real service, then to receive one shilling per day, and never to be called out on *any pretence whatever*, but in case of absolute invasion! The time before the ensuing campaign is too short to put this plan in practice, and, indeed, would be too prolix, at present, to mention, and irrelevant to the immediate subject of this book; but, with pleasure, I am ready to communicate it to your lordship's confidence; for, in general, if made known to the efficient government, the satisfaction, usually, that the officer receives who gives the plan, is, that the

N

same

same has been long in contemplation, although they never dreamed of it.

If the city of London, my Lord, should judge it necessary that those particular places which I have mentioned, should be examined, and should think fit to request, that a board of officers should be appointed for that purpose, I most devoutly trust, that no officer will be appointed on a service of such consequence, but those who have been distinguished for real and active services; for it is not a piece of parchment, with the King's name signed to it, that makes the man an officer; it is his attention to his profession, both on service and when not, employed by any ministry, for that, too often, in every country, is procured by favour; for, indeed, my Lord, if rank and commissions were to constitute the ability of generals in this county, we should have such a superfluity of military knowledge, prowess, valour, and discretion, that neither a Cæsar or a Fabius ever displayed.

I shall

I shall conclude, my Lord, with assuring you, that if the city of London should honour me so much as to approve of the pains I have taken in endeavouring to point out the real defence and safety of the capital, I shall conceive my labours will be most amply paid, and myself highly honoured. I trust, my Lord, that the city of London, your Lordship, and all military men, will acknowledge, that this production has not been the labour of an hour, or a day, but that it must have taken up an infinity of time and reflection, for any officer to reflect on, and to traverse such an immense tract of country in both counties, before he could make himself, in any degree whatever, sufficient master of the ground, to describe, so minutely as I have attempted, the different parts in so extensive a tract of country; it not only requires repeated and various attention in surveying those districts; but much serious reflection, before any officer can presume to write even one single page.

My only intent, my Lord, in this production, has been the desire of assuring my friends and country at large, that, although I have not been actively employed as an officer this war, that my mind has never been idle, but that it has ever been active and attentive to the real interest of my country.— If the city of London and your friendship should so highly honour me as to acknowledge my zeal and attention to the public welfare, I shall esteem it as the most valuable and brightest laurel I ever attempted to gather as an officer.

Copy

Copy of a Letter to the Mayor of ———

SIR,

INCLOSED is a state of military remarks, that I have paid much attention to; as it is five years since I first surveyed the coast near to your town, I trust that you will find it worthy of your consideration. In a work of mine, that is now in the press, which treats of invasions in various parts of this island, it was my intent to mention, there was such a place, and as vulnerable as, I trust, I prove to you that it is, but never to expose your city to the enemy or the public. I imagined, that some persons in power, to whom I shall send that production, would certainly ask me, what place I meant? I then should have informed them it was your city; but as that work will not be out of the press so soon as I expected, and the easterly winds will shortly set in, I think, not a moment should be lost in shewing you the danger your town has been in since the French have been in possession of Holland.

I recom-

I recommend to you, Sir, to report the inclosed plan to the Secretary of State, as I cannot take that liberty, not having the honour of his acquaintance. I assure you, Sir, the undertaking is neither arduous or difficult in the present state your city is—but the danger may be easily prevented. The danger your city has been in is great, and every hour will be greater till steps are taken for its safety. I assure you, Sir, I am so persuaded of it, that if I had been an officer in the enemy's army, I would have burned your town long before now, or taken hostages away for the ransom of it;—it is, in my opinion, the most easy attempt for any partizan officer to execute, and they have many of ten times my abilities; I, therefore, recommend to you, if you regard the safety of your city, to request government will order some able general officers to look at the positions I have pointed out in the inclosed plan, and order proper measures to be taken for the security of your city.—In warning you of this danger, I am conscious that I have discharged my duty to my coun-

try; I trust, Sir, you will do the same to your town.

The place mentioned in the inclosed plan, is the very spot I mean to allude to in my advertisement in the True Briton of the 9th, and Chronicle of the 11th of March, which 3000 men may maintain against a large army.

I remain, Sir, &c.

March 26, 1795.

GEO. HANGER.

With the above letter I sent a regular plan of the approach to that city, to the Mayor, with the distances, landing place, and time required, and positions that might be taken by the enemy, which would render their approach to the town and their retreat to their vessels perfectly secure; and trust I plainly proved, that in one night the enemy might have effected it, and have re-embarked and set sail, before day-light, for their own coast; (I mean in the long nights) at the same time I attempted to point out how easily this misfortune might be prevented,

vented, but requested that my plan of defence for the town might not be relied on in the least, but that I wished a matter of such consequence might be attended to by officers of superior abilities—To which the Mayor politely answered as follows :

SIR,

I RECEIVED your favour, with a plan inclosed, setting forth the situation of ——— and that part of the country, and how necessary it would be for some observations to be made on that ——— for the safety of it ; immediately waited on General ———, who has the command of the ——— district, and gave him your's, and plan ; I also waited on General ——— again yesterday ; he informed me, he had looked over your letter, and plan, and that no time should be lost, and that he had written to Lord ——— about this business.

I remain, Sir,

Your very humble Servant,

*** **

April 9, 1795.

To Lieut. Col. Hanger.

Tilbury Fort and Battery at Gravesend.

THIS Fort certainly was intended and built for the protection of the Thames against shipping. In former days, before the art of gunnery was so well understood, it might have been supposed as a considerable defence to the river; but in these days of greater science and knowledge, we cannot be induced to believe that it is of the least utility and advantage. We all know that if a man of war or a floating battery approach so near to a fort, (especially such a one as Tilbury) so as to throw in a quantity of fire, both from small arms and other engines of destruction, from her *tops*, that she certainly has the advantage of that fort, and is intitled by every military reason to be able to subdue it. We also know, that not only a single ship, but a fleet of men of war may, without much
O injury,

njury, with a leading wind and tide, pass any fort or battery. I once saw in the American war, ten or twelve sail of men of war pass a very strong fort on Sullivan's Island, near Charlestown, South Carolina; they were obliged to approach the fort, first *stem on*, and then expose their broadsides to the fort in passing; after which, even three or four guns lay in such a direction as to fire upon them from the fort after they had passed, and to rake them ast: they were favoured with a fine breeze and tide for the undertaking. The only damage the whole fleet received was the loss of one fore-top-sail yard shot away, a considerable quantity of the running rigging destroyed, some few sails damaged; and not above twenty men in the whole fleet killed or wounded; (to the best of my recollection there were not above twelve men hurt;) the fort kept up a tremendous and unremitted fire the whole time.

I shall make some remarks on Tilbury Fort. First of all, my Lord, I think it is built so
near

near the river side, that a ship may bring up to engage it, and command it from her tops, and will be enabled to approach it so near as to destroy it by her converging fire. If it fortunately had been built at about eight or nine hundred yards from the deep water, it might have been of some service. But, my Lord, there is a more easy method of conquering this fort, the enemy have only to land on the Kent side, and attack the battery at Gravesend in reverse, which battery, in my humble opinion, was made for no other purpose, than to destroy Tilbury Fort.

Last October I was sitting in a friend's house, situated on the terrace at Gravesend, having just passed over from Tilbury and Mucking, from surveying those districts. Taking a view of that county from the opposite shore with a telescope, I turned my eyes to Tilbury Fort, and observed some men working in it : I could see the buckles in their shoes. Your Lordship and every intelligent man must know my meaning ; we ought to repose but little confidence in

either of these batteries, provided the enemy should ever dare to advance so high up the river with their shipping (which I frankly acknowledge if in their senses they never will attempt) a few old, heavy, useless ships, scuttled and sunk in the river above the fort, will be a much greater safety and impediment against their approach.

I will now risk an opinion :—If the present battery of Gravesend had been constructed lower down the river, at such a distance from the water that no ship or floating battery could have commanded it, it would have been of greater use, and might have been placed so to as *rake* any vessel coming down *the Hope*, and also have operated against her whilst passing, and have raked her when passed.

It would be unjust, my Lord, to lay any blame from the false construction of Tilbury Fort to the present age, as it was formed before we were born, I only mean to point out the absolute inutility of it.

THERE is a place in this island of *infinite consequence to us*, to which I have paid much attention, and have not been able to find any defence whatever for it, unless the nation was to be at a most enormous expense in erecting works for its protection, and then, indeed, it would require a greater number of troops to garrison those works than we could spare, as they might be employed to greater effect elsewhere. In short, that system of extensive fortification, I truly, and I trust, justly deprecate. The only method to parry this weakness, is to prevent the enemy from landing any where near to, or approaching it, which may be done.

Be assured, my Lord, that I have too much the interest of my country at heart (and possess so truly the real and true feelings of a true born Briton, who glories in the liberty and happiness of the subject, to the highest extent of their extensive prerogative

gative, which, I trust, both my public and private acts in life have proved) to allow me in any shape whatever to point out the weakness of our island, or to commit any act that might be destructive to the happiness and welfare of my countrymen at large. No, my Lord, I scorn such an action; I have written with an intent only to prove how powerful and invincible we can be as a nation, if proper steps are taken for the safety of our country, and most particularly for the safety of our capital, on which I am of opinion our existence, our wealth, and consequence as a nation depends. You therefore must, my Lord, permit me to remain silent on the situation of the abovementioned place.

Norfolk

Norfolk and Suffolk.

IT is not my intent to write on the defence of these two counties, although I am tolerably well acquainted with them, and particularly with that part of the latter near to Ipswich, Woodbridge, and the coast contiguous to Landguard Fort and Orford. I have heard it given in opinion that the enemy might approach the capital from the coast of Suffolk or Norfolk. I must confess that I differ widely with those persons, as I conceive it next to an impossibility, and certainly very improbable for them to attempt the capital from so long and distant places, when they may land contiguous to it.

I know full well that they may land in Norfolk and Suffolk, and occupy particular districts for a time, and commit devastation,

tion, but I look on the capital as totally out of their reach from two counties at so long a distance from it. But I will for a moment suppose, by the way of argument, that they should attempt to march to London from either of the eastern parts of those two counties; then they must pass the fortified camps I have proposed to be made near to Ilford Barking, and the Hanault Forest; for their direct road must be to Chelmsford in Essex, and so on by the way of Rumbold to Ilford, and Barking. Surely they would not come the long way about over that open country near to Newmarket, and by the way of Epping through that intricate forest, the strength of which, and the obstacles they will meet with, I have so particularly pointed out in the former part of this publication, that it is unnecessary to repeat it again. I only touch on this subject to prove more fully to your Lordship, that should the enemy ever land on the northern banks of the Thames, or on the eastern coast of Essex, Suffolk, or Norfolk, they must absolutely pass this proposed fortified camp near
 Ilford.

Ilford and Barking: they cannot approach the capital without forcing this position. The natural strength of this position is very great, and may easily be made impregnable, which on that side the river will place the capital in perfect safety. There are very strong positions also behind the river Lee, which is in the rear of Ilford and Barking, about two miles, to which river I shall very shortly pay my attention.

The above report of corn contains
4,800,000 bushels Winchester measure.

The king of a Polish word which I cannot
here select, not having his Memoirs by me, but at
the bottom of the page I remember that there is a
word which signifies that each measure contains

Calculated by P. Winchester measure.

Allow

Calculation on Corn—Some Reasons for its Deficiency.

FREDERICK the Great, King of Prussia, in his Memoirs, writes nearly as follows, when he speaks of Poland :—This country is the most fertile in corn, cattle, and horses, of any I know : it has but little trade, but its exports, both in grain and cattle, are to a very considerable amount. Each year, after keeping corn more than sufficient for its own consumption, it exports annually, by the way of Dantzic, 200,000 measures of wheat.*

The above exports of corn contain 4,800,000 bushels Winchester measure.

* The king uses a Polish word, which I cannot here insert, not having his Memoirs by me, but at the bottom of the page I remember that there is a note, which implies that each measure contains twenty-four bushels Winchester measure.

Allow-

Allowing the wheat, upon an average, to weigh fifty-six pounds per bushel, and four bushels to produce one hundred and a half of flour, the above quantity of corn will feed 736,440 persons for half a year, allowing each person one pound and a half of flour per day, which is more than sufficient by *nearly one-third* of the quantity.

It will, I hope, be allowed, that Poland was one of the greatest granaries in Europe in former times, and that from the distressed and ruinous situation it is reduced to at present, there is no supply of corn to be expected from that quarter at present. Brabant was also an immense granary, but from its having been for some years past the seat of war, that country must also be very deficient in grain to what it was. France, it must be acknowledged, is also in an uncultivated state to what it used to be; the debates in the national convention prove that their lands are totally neglected, and that they are much distressed for corn; America

P 2

appears

appears to me to be their sheet anchor against want.

III I am happy to find, that our government are using every means in their power to guard against a greater scarcity of corn in this country, and indeed it behoves them much so to do, as I am informed by persons who are well acquainted with the agriculture of this island, that from the heavy and continual rains last autumn the farmer could not sow much corn at that time; the intense, hard, and long winter setting in immediately after, hindered him again from plowing and sowing; from this unfortunate inclemency of the weather, it is believed, that *one-third* less corn is now in the ground than was last spring.

I shall now attempt to offer an opinion, how the industrious and laborious poor might be supplied with corn at a reasonable price, in times when bread is much dearer than usual; which has been the case this winter, and continues so to be. Why should

not

not the government of this country purchase corn when at a moderate price, and form public magazines in every town in Britain; (nay, almost in every parish) under the care and inspection of the justices of peace and parish officers, to be delivered in time of dearth of bread to the poor, who shall produce a certificate from those by whom they are employed, of their having laboured and performed a certain quantity of work in the week? The quantity of corn to be sold them out of these public magazines should be in proportion to the number they have in their families.

I am of opinion, that if every industrious labourer and mechanic was permitted to purchase corn at the public magazines, that this would be the means of preventing the farmers and cornfactors from forestalling and hoarding up their grain; for if the poor were supplied at a moderate price from the public stores, they would have little or no sale for their corn, provided they kept it up to an exorbitant price, and must bring it to
mar-

market at a more moderate rate, and nearly at the same price as it was sold by government, or it would rot in their possession, which would ruin them.

I do not attempt even to say that this can be put in practice, and I am far from presuming so much, as to attempt to point out how it should be done, but must confess, that I am clearly of opinion, that if public magazines were established, from whence the labouring industrious poor might be supplied at a moderate price, at such times *only* when bread is most extravagantly dear, that we should not hear of any risings or commotions amongst the poor people on account of the dearness of bread.

The King's gracious Donation of
one Pound and a Half of Bread
per Day to each Soldier.

THIS was a noble, gracious, and generous donation from our king and country to the foldier, and it was as necessary as it was generous. I am sorry to say, that the intent and real advantage of this donation (which in its intent was very great) has been in a great degree *perverted*. His majesty's orders were, that each foldier should receive per day one pound and a half in weight of bread; but instead of the pound and a half of bread, the foldier has too generally (with much regret I say it) been only allowed three half-pence per day as a compensation in lieu of the bread. In times when bread was *above two pence* in the quartern loaf cheaper than it *now is*, three half-pence would have been a *fair* allowance, but at present it is
by

by no means equivalent to the gracious intent of his Majesty, as following, I will prove it : The quartern loaf, by the statute, weighs four pounds and a half, and at present costs nine pence one farthing ; at the present rate of bread one pound and a half costs three pence, with the additional fraction of the farthing in the four pounds and a half. As the soldier, when bread is not delivered to him, is only allowed three half-pence per day, of course there is a deficiency of three half-pence, which is exactly one-half of the King's generous intentions to the soldier, as a pound and a half of bread now costs three pence. I know full well, that it is not possible for the commanding officers at all times to deliver to the soldier his allowance per day in bread, especially on the line of march ; but then the soldier is billeted. But I see no reason why the difference in money should not be allowed to the soldier even then, at times of the exorbitant price of bread which it now has amounted to. But if a regiment is destined to stay any time in one district, surely it is in the

power of every commanding officer to contract with the bakers to supply the soldiers, which is very easy to be done, as the more bread the bakers bake the more must they profit; and I most devoutly wish to see every commanding officer of regiments brought to a court martial, and be made responsible for his inattention, who has not endeavoured, by every means in his power, to supply the soldier with the quantity of bread allowed him by his king and country, and not to account to the soldier at the present rate of three halfpence per day, but in bread delivered, or the average price which bread at that particular time is valued at. Then the soldier could have no cause of complaint, he ought to be and would be well satisfied.

I know full well, that the soldier was satisfied to his heart's content, and was grateful for the generous donation of a pound and a half of bread in addition to his *former* pay. It was a wonderful relief to him, he

Q

felt

felt it as such, and was grateful and contented.

Brother foldiers, this is not a time for you to shew any signs of discontent, when your native country is surrounded and oppressed by a vigilant and enterprising enemy. Let me exhort you to obedience, and to an honourable attachment and love to your country's welfare and glory. Both your king and country will see due justice done by you, *be assured of it.* Let me entreat you for a few moments to reflect on and compare the happy, eligible, and more advantageous situation in which you are situated, to that which the poor and industrious mechanic, and the more poor and more laborious day-labouring countryman is; the labouring mechanic has some advantage over the country day labourer, but not much, but reflect only for a moment on the situation of the latter. In all weathers, both hot, cold, wet, and dry, he is obliged to work from sun-rise to sun-set for four-
teen

teen pence per day (if paid by the year) out of this fourteen pence per day, he has to find himself not only provisions but cloaths ; he has also to pay house rent for the miserable hovel he lives in, soap to keep himself clean, and in winter both candles and fire ; and if he has not money sufficient to buy himself a miserable straw or truckle bed to repose his limbs on, wearied by hard labour, he must lay on the floor.

The labouring countryman hardly ever can afford a meal of hot victuals ; if once a week, it certainly is as often, nay more frequent than they in general partake of ; they absolutely live on bread and cheese the greatest part of the year, many never know the taste of hot meat for twelvemonths together, and some absolutely chiefly live on bread only. Added to all these disadvantages, if sickness visits their doors, they not only lose their daily pay, but must also pay the doctor for his medicines.

You, brother soldiers, have cloaths provided for you ; you have, whether in barracks or quarters, a good house over your heads to cover you from the inclemency of the weather, for which you pay no rent ; you have also a comfortable and wholesome bed to sleep in ; you have a hot meal of victuals every day. In sickness, both you, your wives and children, have a skilful doctor to attend you, every nourishment given you, and all attention paid to your complaints and disorders, for which you pay such a mere trifle that you cannot complain ; and all the while during your sickness, your pay is continued to you (which the labourer or mechanic cannot have, but on the days that he is able to perform his work ;) you absolutely have nothing to do but keep yourselves clean, and to attend your military duty ; you also at times are permitted to work, and the industrious part of you profit considerably by their industry.

Let me intreat you, brother soldiers (by all the sacred ties we owe to the glory and
5
wel-

welfare of our country) to sobriety, good order, and discipline ; your gallantry is beyond question, as your national courage has been proverbial for ages past ; then this country may brave all her enemies, and bid them defiance. The gallant tar, by sea, gives you fresh instances every day of his love for his country's honour, dignity, and glory ; do you but continue to act with that spirit and alacrity in the defence of your country for which you have ever been so justly distinguished. The soldier and the sailor, jointly, by their exertions (with an attentive desire shewn to pacific measures by the government of the country) may insure an honourable and lasting peace to their fellow countrymen ; which, my brave fellows, is the most hearty wish of your most devoted, unalterable, and most attached friend and fellow soldier,

GEORGE HANGER,
Lieutenant-colonel.

Contents and Summary of the whole.

THAT the capital was left in the year 1794 in a defenceless state.

When the camp broke up at Warley, which was the most likely time for the enemy to attempt a landing in the Thames; that the troops were dispersed, and the capital left open to the depredations of the French.

That there has been no troops at all in Kent, *contiguous to the capital.*

That it is supposed that twenty thousand men, in the year 1794, might have landed in the Thames and marched to the capital, as there was nothing by land or water to have prevented them.

That

That no provision was made for a communication over the Thames by the means of flat boats and scows.

That an entrenched camp on each side the Thames is the safety of the metropolis.

That the Thames is the nearest place to the capital where the enemy can land, and the best calculated either for a coup de main, or an operation in force against it.

That every precaution should be taken to prevent the enemy coming into the Thames, and most *particularly* not to allow them to gain possession of *the Hope*.

That the works proposed will effectually hinder even their anchoring in the Hope ; and that the works and position of our troops will prevent their landing on the Essex side the Thames, in the Hope.

That our grand fleet cannot prevent an invasion in the shoal waters.

That

That if the enemy come with a superior flotilla, they may land, if precautions are not taken on shore to prevent, or render their landing abortive.

That the position of an army at Brighton is false and unmilitary, and of no essential use.

That the capital once in the enemy's hands, would render us little better than a province to France.

That the destruction of Plymouth, Portsmouth, or any place of consequence in the whole island, will only be a partial injury sustained that may be repaired; but that the loss of the capital never can, and must ruin our consequence as a nation.

That at least fifteen thousand, or twenty thousand troops should *ever* be stationed in Essex and Kent, with a communication by boats over the Thames.

That

That no diversion of the enemy against any part of England should prevail on us to leave the capital, without twenty thousand troops to protect it.

That there are particular times in the year when the easterly winds prevail and blow strong, that our fleet laying at Plymouth or Spithead, cannot come up the channel, or relieve any place east from them.

That no fleet laying in the Downs, when the wind blows strong at east, can weather the North Foreland, and come into the Thames.

That our fleet laying in Yarmouth Roads,* when the wind blows strong at east, dare not venture to weigh anchor for the Thames, as on the whole passage they would be subjected to a lee shore; therefore, that from

* I am informed that there is a channel between the Nore and Harwich, I forget the name of it, where ships may safely ride, except in an absolute hurricane; I believe it is called the Swinn.

R

the

the two above considerations of the Downs and Yarmouth Roads, the most proper and only place for the rendezvous and station of that part of our fleet which shall be destined to protect our eastern coast, should be in the mouth of the Thames.

That ever since the French have been in possession of Holland, no part of our fleet has been stationed in the mouth of the Thames, which the author presumes is *the only place* for our *eastern fleet to rendezvous at*, by which neglect that river was left open to the enemy, by which they might have attempted a blow against the capital, there having been nothing of consequence also to prevent them by land.

That we ought not to imagine that the French are not acquainted with the strong and weak parts of our coasts, as well as we are.

That an actual survey of a very considerable part of this island was ordered to be
made

made by some of our most skilful draftsmen, and that *those charts*, before the present war broke out, *were sent to Paris to be engraved.*

That if France should make peace with some of the foreign powers, which they seem inclined to do, against what place can she turn the powers of her numerous armies, but against this island or Ireland, which is *more probable?*

That the attention of the French may be drawn from this country for a certain time, by a desire of taking possession of Hanover, which cannot be prevented but by a total defeat of their *grand army*; and as we have every reason to believe that the task is too arduous for the Austrians alone to place Hanover in safety, and if we do not experience a more cordial assistance *in force* from the Prussians, which we have so truly wished for, Hanover appears in a perilous situation, and the French have great prospects of success.

That Ireland being the weaker kingdom, it is more likely for the French to attempt the invasion of that island ; but let it be observed, that they run the most imminent risk of being met by our fleet at sea, which danger they will not be so subjected to in an expedition against this country.

That the country in general have undervalued the enterprize and valour of the French nation ; and that it has been as generally believed, that the French could never land in England, as long as our channel fleet were masters of the sea, which idea has been founded in too great a national arrogance, in trusting too much to our naval superiority, as relative to the safety of this island from an invasion.

That the inhabitants of London should be informed that the French can invade us notwithstanding we have the superiority at sea ; and that at the same time the danger is pointed out, to put them on their guard, that they should also be shewn the strength and
 4 defence

defence of their country, that they may not be alarmed if such an event should take place, as there is nothing to be more guarded against than a panic seizing any body of men, which might be the case, were the French unexpectedly and suddenly to attempt a landing in the Thames.

That if the real strength and safety of the capital is pointed out, every inhabitant who wishes well to his country, or regards his property, will fly to arms, and repair to the proper place of defence; but if they are not forewarned, and those places not pointed out to them, in a moment of sudden fear and panic the capital may be deserted; but, on the contrary, if it is proved to them, how both with safety and honour they may defend the capital, they will be convinced of their own powers and strength, and will scorn an ignominious and ruinous flight; being convinced that the enemy can and may land, they will boldly await and expect them, and more boldly oppose them.

That

That until the French have been in possession of Holland, we have never attended properly to the *internal* defence of our island, but have ever conceived ourselves safe from invasion, as long as we continue superior at sea, which idea the author conceives to be erroneous, and founded on false principles, and too great national presumption on our naval superiority.

F I N I S.



NEW PUBLICATIONS

Printed for J. DEBRETT, PICCADILLY.

A NARRATIVE of the BRITISH EMBASSY to CHINA, in the Years 1791, 1792, 1793, and 1794; containing a faithful, interesting, and impartial Relation of the various Circumstances of the EMBASSY, with Accounts of the Customs and Manners of the Chinese; and a Description of the Country, Towns, Cities, &c. &c. By Æneas Anderson, then in the Service of his Excellency Earl Macartney, K. B. Ambassador from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China. Elegantly printed in one Volume Royal Quarto, price One Guinea in boards.

* * The very great Eagerness with which my NARRATIVE of the late BRITISH EMBASSY to CHINA has been read and purchased, and the favourable Opinion which has been given of it by many Persons of distinguished Character and Abilities, is more than sufficient, as far as relates to myself, to make me treat with silent Contempt the very pitiful Endeavours which have been made to injure the Sale of my Work, and the Character of its Author, by representing the Book as a FABRICATION, and myself of course the FABRICATOR. But in Justice to the Public, to whose Patronage I am so much indebted, I feel it a Duty to declare, in this Manner, that my Narrative of Earl Macartney's Embassy is an honest and fair Account of it; and I call upon those who, with myself, were employed in its Service, and are concerned in its Honour, to come forward, and if it is in their Power, to contradict this Declaration.

ÆNEAS ANDERSON.

*Marbam-street,
April 25, 1795.*

THOUGHTS on the PRINCE's DEBTS. Second Edition, price 1s.

A FULL REPORT of all the PROCEEDINGS on the TRIAL of the Rev. W. JACKSON, at the Bar of his Majesty's Court of King's Bench in Ireland, on an Indictment for HIGH TREASON; containing the Speeches at length of the Attorney General, and Messrs. Ponsonby and Curran, with the Documents and Letters at full length given in Evidence; and also the Inquisition and Verdict, with a copy of a Paper found in the Pocket of the Prisoner after his Decease, price 3s.

Two

New Publications printed for J. Debrett.

TWO LETTERS of **EARL FITZWILLIAM**, who recently retired from the Kingdom of Ireland, to the **EARL of CARLISLE**, explaining the Causes of that Event. Second Edition, price 1s each.

The **SPEECH** of the Right Hon. **CHARLES JAMES FOX**, in the House of Commons, on Tuesday the 24th of March, on his Motion for the House to resolve itself into a Committee, to take into Consideration the **STATE** of the **NATION**. Second Edition, price 1s.

A COLLECTION of **STATE PAPERS**, RELATIVE TO THE WAR AGAINST FRANCE, now carrying on by **GREAT BRITAIN**, and the several other **EUROPEAN POWERS**; containing authentic Copies of

Treaties,
Conventions,
Proclamations,
Manifestoes,
Declarations,
Memorials,

Remonstrances,
Official Letters,
Parliamentary Papers,
London Gazette Accounts
of the War, &c. &c. &c.

Many of which have never before been published in England. In two large vols. 8vo. Price 11 rs in boards.

THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER; or the **HISTORY** of the **PROCEEDINGS** and **DEBATES** of **LORDS** and **COMMONS**; containing an Account of the most interesting Speeches and Motions, authentic Copies of all important Letters and Papers laid before either House.

Vol. First of the **PRESENT SESSION**, price 9s 6d half bound.

Numbers **XIII.** and **XIV.** of the **DEBATES** of the **PRESENT SESSION**, will be published in a few Days.

The **PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER**, from 1780 to 1794, in 39 vols. price 17l 11s 6d half bound and lettered.

The **DEBATES** in both **HOUSES** of **PARLIAMENT**, from 1743 to 1774, in 7 vols. price 21 9s in boards.

The **WORKS** of **JOHN HALL STEVENSON**, **AUTHOR** of **CRAZY TALES**, &c. including several **POEMS**, now first published from the original **MS.** with two Engravings, in 3 vols. cr. 8vo. price 15s in boards.



W

